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Abstract 
Utility modeled as a power function is commonly used in the literature despite the fact 
that it is unbounded and generates asset pricing puzzles. The unboundedness property 
leads to St. Petersburg paradox issues and indifference to compound gambles, but these 
problems have largely been ignored. The asset pricing puzzles have been solved by 
introducing habit formation to the usual power utility. Given these issues, we believe it is 
time re-examine exponential utility.   Exponential utility was abandoned largely because 
it implies increasing relative risk aversion in a cross-section of individuals and non-
stationarity of the aggregate consumption to wealth ratio, contradicting macroeconomic 
data. We propose an alternative preference specification with exponential utility and 
relative habit formation. We show that this utility function is bounded, consistent with 
asset pricing facts, generates near-constant relative risk aversion in a cross-section of 
individuals and a stationary ratio of aggregate consumption to wealth.  
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1. Introduction  
 Exponential utility functions have been mostly abandoned from economic theory 
despite their analytical convenience. On the other hand, power utility, which is also 
highly tractable, has become the workhorse of modern macroeconomics and asset 
pricing. This apparent preference of power utility over exponential utility by the literature 
was mainly motivated by two important economic observations: 
First, most empirical studies suggest risk aversion among individuals with 
different levels of wealth is roughly constant [Friend and Blume (1975)]. The exponential 
utility function given by  
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exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (equal to A > 0), hence generates increasing 
relative risk aversion (IRRA). The cross-sectional implication of this is that wealthier 
people are more risk-averse and in their portfolio choice invest a smaller proportion of 
their wealth in the risk-free asset [Merton (1992)]. This prediction is counterintuitive and 
is contradicted by empirical studies. Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), power 
utility which is given by  
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on the other hand, exhibits constant relative risk aversion (equal to 0! > ) and hence is 
immune from this criticism.1 
The second observation motivating the use of CRRA power utility over 
exponential utility is that aggregate consumption to wealth ratio is stationary in the data. 
                                                
1 Merton for example states that he finds CARA utility “behaviorally less plausible than” CRRA due to 
their different portfolio choice implications (Merton [1969]). 
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With exponential utility, optimal consumption is linear in wealth, but not proportional to 
wealth, hence their ratio is not stationary [Merton (1992)].2 With CRRA power utility, 
optimal consumption is proportional to wealth and therefore consumption-wealth ratio is 
stationary and thus consistent with a balanced growth path. 
Despite the aforementioned strengths, the CRRA, power utility also has its 
weaknesses.   The best known weakness of the CRRA power utility is that it has 
undesirable asset pricing implications. In particular, it has a hard time matching the high 
risk-premium observed in the data unless one assumes very high values of relative risk 
aversion; this is known as the equity premium puzzle [Mehra and Precott (1985)]. In a 
Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (C-CAPM) with CRRA power utility, 
an asset is risky if the covariance of its returns with consumption growth is high. Agents 
prefer to hold assets which give high returns when times are bad (i.e. when consumption 
is low and marginal utility of consumption is high) and would like to avoid assets which 
give low returns when times are bad. To hold assets which co-vary positively with 
consumption growth, agents require a higher risk-premium. 
Even if one accepts high relative risk aversion, the CRRA, power utility still 
generates problems, this time in accounting for the low risk-free rates observed in the 
data. With power utility, the risk aversion parameter !  is also the inverse of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. High risk aversion therefore implies a very small 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution: people who wish to avoid volatile consumption 
will also wish to avoid secular growth in consumption. Since consumption actually grows 
over time, people should be demanding high interest rates in compensation. The low risk-
                                                
2 Note however that optimal consumption is linear in wealth, hence the consumption-wealth ratio does 
approach a constant asymptotically.  
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free rates observed in the data are thus a puzzle; i.e. the risk-free rate puzzle [Weil 
(1989)].  
The desirable properties of power utility have been preserved in spite of the 
puzzles by modifying the model to include habit formation.  (see Sunderasan [1989], 
Constantinides [1990] and more recently, Campbell and Cochrane [1999]).  These 
models employ a decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA) form of power utility:  
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Where Z is the so-called “habit” level of consumption and C-Z is sometimes referred to 
as “surplus” consumption.  The habit level can either be internally generated by 
individual past consumption, as in the models of Sunderasan (1989) and Constantinides 
(1990), or can be externally generated by aggregate consumption, as in Campbell and 
Cochrane (1999).  This formulation can solve the asset pricing puzzles because secular 
growth in consumption leads to roughly proportional growth in surplus consumption, 
where γ determines aversion to secular growth.  Volatility in C does not affect Z and 
aversion to volatility is measured by γ  times the ratio of consumption to surplus 
consumption.3  With assumed surplus consumption between 10 and 20 percent, aversion 
to volatility can be 5-10 times the aversion to secular growth.4,5   
                                                
3 Relative risk aversion is γC/(C-Z) 
4 Abel (1990) and Gali (1990) adopt a relative form of habit, where the argument of the utility function is 
C/Z, but they stick with power utility.  This form of habit leads to a different solution to the risk-free 
puzzle, which we will detail below. 
5 Another idea was to separate the parameters governing risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution directly by making utility recursive and non-separable across states of nature (Epstein and Zin 
[1991]). 
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But power utility whether of the CRRA or DRRA flavors also has a long known 
weakness due to unboundedness.6 Unbounded utility can result in so-called St. 
Petersburg-style paradoxes where events with vanishingly small probabilities of 
occurrence have a finite effect on behavior. For example, for the familiar case of utility 
being unbounded from above, where agents choose to take on gambles with a large 
probability of considerable losses, but a tiny probability of infinite gains. Similarly, if 
utility is not bounded from below, vanishingly small probabilities of infinite losses may 
preclude agents from taking on an otherwise reasonable gamble [Arrow (1971)]. 
  Exponential utility on the other hand is bounded and is consistent with the 
observed equity-premium without resorting to an extremely high risk aversion parameter. 
The weaknesses of power utility are the strengths of the exponential utility, just as the 
strengths of power utility are their weaknesses. But given the weaknesses of power 
utility, we believe it is worth trying to solve the weaknesses of exponential. In this paper 
we suggest an exponential utility with habit formation where utility is defined over the 
ratio of consumption to the habit level of consumption (relative habit):    
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This utility function preserves the strengths of the standard exponential utility function, 
but solves the weaknesses, namely ensures the stationarity of consumption relative to 
wealth and the near-constancy of relative risk aversion across the population with 
                                                
6 With Z less than zero, power utility implies IRRA.  While this utility function is bounded (for γ >1),  it 
cannot solve the risk-free rate puzzle. One interpretation for this specification is that -Z stands for housing 
services, as in Davis and Martin (2005). They conclude that housing cannot solve the asset pricing puzzles 
if consumption and housing services are not complementary.  We will not consider the IRRA version of 
power utility further.  
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different levels of wealth and solves the risk-free puzzle because of the absence of secular 
growth in C/Z.  
Table 1 provides a brief synopsis on the utility functions we considered and 
summarizes the main points we made so far (an X in a particular box indicates that the 
corresponding utility function is in line with the corresponding issue):  
Table 1: Synopsis on Utility Functions 
           Utility 
Issue 
Power with 
no habit 
Power with 
habit, C-Z 7 
Power with 
relative 
habit, C/Z 8 
Exp. with 
no habit  
Exp. with 
habit,  
C-Z9 
Exp. with 
relative 
habit, C/Z 
Bounded Utility    X X X 
Observed equity 
premium  X X X X X 
Risk-free Rate  X X   X 
Stationarity of 
Cons. / Wealth 
X X X   X 
Similar RRA 
across individuals 
X X X   X 
 
 
 The next section re-examines a long-standing issue for unbounded power utility: 
what we call indifference to compound gambles.  Samuelson (1963) appears to have 
disposed of this issue by convincing the profession that the special results of CRRA, 
power utility made sense.  We show that more plausible results arise from IRRA utility 
functions, such as exponential utility.  In section 3, we look at the equity premium 
puzzles in terms of the properties of the direct utility function of consumption and the 
indirect utility function with of wealth.  This analysis allows us to explain how a simple, 
                                                
7 Sundaresan (1989) and Constantinides (1990). 
8 Abel (1990) and Gali (1990). 
9 Sundaresan (1989) 
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exponential utility function solves our re-stated equity premium puzzle, and also shows 
that indirect utility function of the power utility habit formation model is inconsistent 
with the data.  In section 4, we introduce our version of the exponential utility with 
relative habit formation.  We show the relationship between the direct and indirect utility 
function, and explain how relative habit eliminates the risk-free rate puzzle.   In section 4 
we conclude. 
 
2.  Unboundedness and Indifference to Compound Gambles 
As already noted, CRRA preferences are subject to St. Petersburg-type paradoxes 
because of unbounded utility. A related problem of CRRA, power utility that is due to the 
unbounded utility, is what we call indifference to compound gambles.  With preferences 
that exhibit constant relative risk aversion, an individual’s choice for a gamble does not 
depend on the number of times the gamble is performed.  Consider the gamble where 
wealth will increase by the factor X >1, with probability P > ½ and will decrease by 1/X, 
with probability (1-P) (local relative risk aversion is assumed to be greater than one). 
Assume that the values of P and X have been selected so that our subject is indifferent to 
the one-trial gamble     
(2.1)  [ ] 10 1 0 0 0( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ),E V W PV W X P V W X V W
!
= + ! =  
where 0( )V W is the indirect utility function, the value of lifetime utility after one has 
optimized consumption and portfolio choice. The subscript on W indicates the number of 
trials for the gamble. 
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Now consider an alternative gamble where the outcomes are based on two 
binomial trials with the same values for X and P.  The subject’s expected utility from this 
“compound” gamble is given by 
(2.2) [ ] 2 2 2 20 2 0 0 0( ) ( ) 2 (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )E V W P V W X P P V W P V W X
!
= + ! + !  
We are not imagining the two gambles as being sequential, where the subject could 
choose whether to continue after observing the outcome of the first trial.  Instead, we are 
asking our subject to commit ex ante to the outcomes of the two-trial gamble10  
A constant relative risk aversion subject who is indifferent to the one-trial gamble 
will be also be indifferent to the outcomes based on two binomial trials because the utility 
consequences of the two-trial gamble are just the square of the one-trial gamble. 
(2.3)  0 0( ) ( ) ( ) ,  for any 
a a
V W X V W V X a=  
Of course, an exactly similar argument can be made for a gamble based on 3 or more 
binomial trials where the outcomes are adjusted accordingly.  
 But herein lies the paradox: with P > 0.511, the probability of a loss gets smaller 
and smaller as the number of trials increases.  As the number of trials increases without 
limit, the probability of a loss approaches zero, but our CRRA subject will value this 
gamble as equal to the first gamble.  While the probability of losses is going to zero, the 
maximum size of those losses is increasing without limit and the utility consequences of 
those losses have finite consequences with constant relative risk aversion.   This strikes 
us as implausible as people do seem to take chances such as those in many everyday 
situations (e.g. driving, flying on an airplane).  Arrow (1971) formalized this in the 
                                                
10 While Samuelson (1963) does not consider proportional gambles, he does assume a one trial gamble 
based on a sequence of trials.  See his footnote 2 section 4. 
 
11 P>0.5 requires relative risk aversion greater than 1. 
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principle that events with vanishingly small probabilities of occurrence should not have 
finite effects on behavior, and this principle is violated by CRRA power utility.   
 These implausible results are specific to constant relative risk aversion 
preferences. Preferences with increasing relative risk aversion can avoid these problems 
because they avoid the problem of unbounded utility at either high or low levels of 
wealth.  For example, exponential utility and IRRA power utility functions are bounded 
and exhibit increasing relative risk aversion:  For subjects with these preferences a two-
trial gamble is preferred to no gamble, even when the subject is indifferent between the 
one-trial gamble and no gamble.  With increasing relative risk aversion (as is shown in 
the Appendix): 
(2.4)  
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More generally, our increasing relative risk aversion subject will accept any gamble, 
where P > 0.5, X>1 if one allows a sufficient number of trials.12  DRRA power utility, 
however, makes the situation worse because: 1) A DRRA subject would reject a two-trial 
gamble, if she were indifferent to the one trial gamble; 2) A gamble with any probability 
of hitting the capitalized value of habit consumption will be rejected, no matter how 
favorable the odds because the utility consequence of hitting the capitalized value is 
unbounded. 
                                                
12 Samuelson’s (1963) in an article entitled the “Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers” has a 
sharp criticism of a faculty lunchroom colleague who believes the number of times the gamble is performed 
matters by the “Law of Large Numbers.”  Samuelson is careful (footnote 1 section 8), however, to note: 
“[My theorem] does not state one must always refuse a sequence if one refuses a single venture:  if at 
higher income levels the single tosses become acceptable, and at lower levels the penalty of losses does not 
become infinite, there might well be a long sequence that is optional.”    
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As noted in the introduction, there are problems with exponential utility, but this 
section has shown that there are also problems with the CRRA and DRRA versions of 
power utility.  As a result, we will explore the advantages of exponential utility and ways 
of avoiding its disadvantages 
   
3.  The Equity Premium Puzzle:  
 Since the development of consumption-based portfolio choice models and Mehra 
and Prescott’s (1985) path breaking work, most attention has focused on the asset-pricing 
implications of Euler equations based on the direct utility function.  We believe it is 
important to look at this issue in terms of all of the implied properties of the model, 
including implications for the indirect utility function and the consumption function. 
Consider the following portfolio allocation problem: 
(3.1)
[ ] [ ]
[ ]{ }
( )
( ), ( )
0
2
( ) max ( )
                  s.t.  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
                  s.t.  log ( ) ~ ,
t
C t t
V W t E e U C t dt
dW
t t r r W t C t
dt
t N
!
"
" #
# µ $
%
&=
= & + &
'
 
where ρ is the pure rate of time preference;  φ is the share in the risky asset;  α is the return 
on the risky asset, r is the risk-free interest rate, µ  is the expected return on the log of the 
risky asset and σ2 its variance. With CRRA power utility given in (1.2), the equilibrium 
expected risk-premium can be approximated by (in discrete time) 
(3.2)                                     
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In the data, the risk-premium is high, but the covariance of consumption with the risky 
return is low, hence the only way to reconcile this is to entertain a very high ! , i.e. a very 
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high relative risk aversion for the direct utility function [Cochrane (2006)]. This is the 
equity-premium puzzle. 
We also find it informative to look at other implications of this utility 
specification. Note that when the direct utility function U(C) is of the CRRA power 
utility form with constant relative risk aversion γ, the indirect utility function V(W) is also 
characterized by constant relative risk aversion of the same degree. The Euler equation 
can also be expressed in terms of the indirect utility function which would imply 
(3.3)     
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As noted by Cochrane (2006), in fact there is no equity premium puzzle for the CRRA 
indirect utility function.  Notice that, in a two asset world where φ∗ is the optimal share in 
the risky asset, (3.3) reduces to: 
(3.4)      2
* ( ) ( ) (1 *) ( )
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which is just the equation for optimal portfolio allocation 
(3.5)                                                      
2
*
rµ
!
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$
=  
 Kocherlakota (1996)’s data exhibit an average risk premium of 6% with variance 
of slightly under 3%.  Therefore, relative risk aversion of the indirect utility function of 
anything over 2 is consistent with risky asset shares less than one, with the observed risk 
premium and volatility of wealth. 
 The equity risk premium puzzle arises because the volatility of wealth is much 
greater than the volatility of consumption growth (by more than a factor of ten in 
Kocherlakota’s [1996] data).  With CRRA power utility, optimal consumption is 
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proportional to wealth.   So it would be just as accurate to say that with CRRA 
preferences the puzzle is to explain the excessive consumption smoothing. 
 Meyer and Meyer’s (2005) Proposition I is helpful for summarizing this analysis: 
(3.6)    ,( ) ( ) ( )  V U U C W
dC W
R W R C R C
dW C
!= = " , 
where RV or U  is relative risk aversion for either the indirect or direct utility functions and 
,C W
!  is the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth.  The data tell us that the left 
hand side of (3.6) needs to be something above and close to 2.  The requirement for 
consumption smoothing can be stated either as a model where 
,C W
!  (equal to the 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth divided by the average propensity) is 
substantially below 1, or equivalently and more traditionally, where the relative risk 
aversion of the direct utility function is much higher than 2.   
 But Merton shows that for exponential utility as in (1.1), optimal consumption is 
also a linear function of wealth, where the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 
is the real interest rate and the average propensity varies with the time horizon. For the 
infinite horizon case, the optimal choice for consumption is given by  
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Thus the elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth is the real interest times the 
inverse of the APC. In this case (at least for the point estimates of the data)13 the puzzle is 
not why consumption is so smooth, but rather why is it so volatile.  With Kocherlakota’s 
                                                
13 Cochrane (2006) points out that since the equity premium is estimated imprecisely, the confidence 
interval around the required degree of risk aversion is large. 
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[1996] estimate of a real T-bill rate of 1%, the variance of consumption growth should be 
close to zero (this of course ignores the volatility in the “risk-free” interest rate)!  Put in 
the more traditional way and assuming a consumption wealth ratio of somewhere 
between 3 and 4, (local) relative risk aversion of the indirect utility function of around 2, 
by (3.6) implies (local) relative risk aversion for the direct utility function of something 
between 50 and 67.  
 Notice, if one compares all of the properties of the DRRA power utility model, 
the complete model has far more trouble with the data.  Merton (1992) has shown that for 
DRRA power utility, the two measures of relative risk aversion can be written as14: 
(3.8)  ( ) ;   ( )
/
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! != =
" "
     
in Merton’s model Z should be thought of as a time invariant subsistence level.  At a 
moment in time, the distinction between subsistence and time-varying habit is 
unimportant.  We will continue to call C-Z surplus consumption, which suggests calling 
W – Z/r surplus wealth.  This measure is just total wealth less the capitalized value of 
future subsistence needs, using the real interest rate as a discount rate.15 Consequently, 
the ratio of wealth to surplus wealth will be at least as great as the ratio of consumption to 
surplus consumption.  Therefore, the properties of the complete model cannot fit the data.  
Setting RU(C) high enough to match the consumption, Euler equation implies ridiculously 
low levels of holdings of the risky asset.   This is particularly evident when one 
recognizes that the amount held in the risky asset is a fraction based on RV(W) times 
surplus wealth.     
                                                
14 See Merton(1991), pp 138-9, where our γ replaces his 1- γ, our Z replaces his -δη,and his β is equal to 1.  
15 (3.8) uses the infinite horizon version of the model, but the sentence is true for finite horizons as well. 
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The exponential utility model does not match the point estimates of the data 
perfectly; in particular the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth seems low, 
aversion to consumption volatility seems high. However, it is not off by the orders of 
magnitude of the complete DRRA power utility model. Notice also that the exponential 
model solves the equity premium puzzle without imposing a high-degree of relative risk 
aversion on V(W), and it is this indirect utility function that matters when studying issues 
such as insurance.  As opposed to Cochrane’s (2006, p28) pessimistic conclusion that the 
equity premium puzzle can only be solved with high risk aversion, we believe the 
exponential utility model largely solves the puzzle with low risk aversion. 
But the exponential utility model still has a problem:  the high implied relative 
risk aversion for the direct utility function exacerbates the risk-free puzzle.  As we show 
in the next section, the risk-free puzzle can be solved by adopting a form of habit 
formation where utility depends on consumption relative to wealth.  
  
4. Exponential Utility with Habit Formation 
As argued in section 3, when preferences are described by the exponential utility function 
as in  (1.1) the optimal choice for consumption and share of risky asset are given by 
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The first implication from the above optimal consumption rule is that these 
preferences are not consistent with a balanced growth path along which consumption and 
wealth would grow at the same rate. This is clearly at odds with the data and standard 
growth theory. On the other hand, as pointed out in section 3, this optimal consumption 
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rule is consistent with volatile wealth and smooth consumption observed in the data. One 
challenge therefore is to generate an optimal consumption rule that would be consistent 
with a balanced growth, but will still be consistent with volatile wealth and smooth 
consumption. 
The above optimal choice for the share of the risky asset in the portfolio implies 
that wealth is inversely related to the share of risky asset; this is a direct result of 
increasing relative risk aversion property of these preferences. The relative risk aversion 
for the direct and the indirect utility functions are given by  
(4.2)   ( ) ( )  and  U VR C AC R W ArW= =  
which imply that wealthier people are more risk averse which is again at odds with 
empirical observations.   
 But the problems with exponential utility disappear if we assume direct utility is a 
function of consumption relative to some habit level of consumption. Consider the 
following lifetime portfolio choice problem given by 
(4.3)  
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where the last constraint is describing how the habit level of consumption, Z, evolves 
over time.16 Redefining the variables as /  and /c C Z w W Z= = , the portfolio choice 
problem can be written as: 
(4.4)  
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With the direct utility function defined by (1.4) we can show that the indirect utility 
function is given by  
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 The solution to the optimal portfolio problem is given by 
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Note that the optimal consumption rule is now consistent with balanced growth (since the 
habit level of consumption is growing over time at roughly the same rate), and can still 
generate volatile wealth with much smoother consumption because the marginal 
propensity to spend out of wealth is still the real interest rate. Also note that the relative 
risk aversion factors on the direct and the indirect utility functions are the same as before 
                                                
16 This evolution for the habit level is not standard in the literature, however we use it in order to derive a 
closed form solution for the indirect utility function. All derivations of this section is given in the 
Appendix. 
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except now they are defined over relative consumption and wealth, hence they can 
generate roughly constant relative risk aversion across individuals as long as richer 
people’s habit consumptions are proportionally higher. 
 The last remaining problem is to explain the risk-free rate puzzle.  The derivation 
of the Euler equation for the risk-free rate is tedious and relegated to the Appendix, where 
it is shown that: 
(4.7)   ( )
2
/ 2
*
2
W Z
r E g
!
" ! # $% = %  
where γ  is local relative risk aversion of the indirect utility function and gw/z is growth in 
relative wealth.  Notice that relative risk aversion eliminates the risk-free puzzle by 
eliminating secular growth in the argument of the utility functions, i.e., ( )/w zE g  is 
roughly zero, and the last term helps to explain the low risk-free interest rate.  Again, 
using Kocherlakota’s [1996], (4.7) can be fulfilled with r =.01, γ = 2, φ∗ =1, if the pure 
rate of time preference is 7%.      
 
IV. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we laid out a case for reviving the use of exponential utility. CRRA 
power utility, the workhorse of modern macro macroeconomics and asset-pricing 
literature, leads to St. Petersburg-style paradoxes due to its unboundedness, is indifferent 
to compound gambles and generates asset pricing puzzles. Although adding habit 
formation has solved many of the asset pricing problems of power utility, we think it 
might be worthwhile to start reconsidering the use of exponential utility.  
Exponential utility had been abandoned mainly because it generates increasing 
relative risk aversion in the cross-section and is not consistent with balanced growth. The 
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strengths of exponential are that it is bounded and is consistent with a high risk-premium. 
We augment the standard exponential utility with habit formation and show that these 
preferences are bounded, not indifferent to compound gambles, generate near-constant 
relative risk aversion in the cross-section and are consistent with the high risk-premium 
and low risk-free rate and are consistent with the volatility of consumption and wealth. 
Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) clearly made a major contribution by 
placing portfolio choice in the context of a model based on the utility of consumption.  
We believe that the profession, by focusing so much attention on the direct utility 
function, has paid insufficient attention to the model’s consistency with the indirect 
utility function as well as implications for volatility of consumption and wealth.  In 
judging whether a model is broadly consistent with the data, we believe that one must 
examine all aspects of the model; i.e., direct and indirect utility function and consumption 
function.  
Future research should also concentrate on the business cycle implications of 
exponential utility with habit formation alongside with the asset pricing implications to 
ensure applicability of these preferences in a variety of contexts.  
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Appendix: 
A. Compound Gambles and Relative Risk Aversion:   
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A power utility function with increasing relative risk aversion can be written as: 
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B. Exponential Utility with Habit Consumption 
The portfolio choice problem is given by: 
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Hence the portfolio choice problem can be written as 
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Bellman’s optimality condition: 
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Equilibrium conditions: 
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Application to exponential utility with habit: 
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Trial solution: 
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This needs to hold for any w, hence it must be the case that  
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C.  The Euler Equation for the Risk-free Rate in Continuous Time 
 
In discrete time our model can be written as: 
*
;
[ ]
[ ]
*
' '
ht t t h
t t t h
t h t t h t t t t h t t h
t h t t h t h t h t t h t t h
t
t h t t
t
t h t t h t t
t h t t h t h
ht t
t t
W C W
V U h e E V
Z Z Z
W W W W W W W W Z
Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z Z
Z
Z C Z h
W
W W W C Z
h
Z Z Z Z
C Wh
U e E V
Z Z
!
!
"
"
# +
+
+ + + +
+ + + + + +
+
+ +
+ + +
#
$ %& ' & ' & '
= + ( )* + * + * +
, - , - , -. /
0 0
# = # + # = #
0 = #
0 #
# = #
& '
#* +
, -
0
limit as 0
rh
h
t h t h
e h
Z Z
h
"
+
+ +
$ %& ' $ %+
=( )* + ( )
, - . /. /
1
 
( )
( )
2
2
*
' 1 ' " "'
*
' 1 ' " "'
t t
t t t t t t t t
t tt t t t t t
t t
W
t t t t Z
t
t t t t
W W
C W W W Z W W Z
U r V V E E V
W WZ Z Z Z Z Z
Z Z
C W W W W
U r V V E g V
Z Z Z Z
! "
! "
# $% & % &' '( )* + * +% & % & % & % &% &( )* + * +, + , + , +* + * + * + * +* +( )* + * +- . - . - . - .- .( )* + * +
- . - .( )/ 0
% &% & % & % &
, + , + , +* +* + * + * +
- . - . - . - .
2
2
*
2
t t
t t
W
Z Z
1 2% &% &
* +* +
- .- .
 
 
( )
( )
2 2
2 2
2
2
*
In continuous time ' (1 ) '
1 *
1 ;
1 1 2 1
where  is local relative risk aversion.
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The last line above is (4.7) in the text. 
